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CULTURAL CONTEXT MATTERS: TERRY'S
"SEESAW EFFECT"
FRANK RUDY COOPER*

Abstract
This Article investigates why the enforcement of a given legal doctrine may
vary with changes in the cultural context in which it is applied. It argues that
officials apply the law along an "enforcement practices continuum" in accord
with changes in the prevailing articulations of the meaning of cultural identity
norms associating particular groups with crime.
Terry v. Ohio doctrine allows police officers to make "stops" and "frisks"
of limited scope upon reasonable suspicion of crime rather than requiring the
higher standard of probable cause. The Article contends the officer discretion
resulting from this "scope continuum" approach permits cultural identity
norms to influence enforcement practices. While scholars have noted that the
discretion permitted under Terry encourages racial profiling, this Article
identifies a larger problem: Terry's "seesaw effect." That is, the cultural
context in which law enforcement occurs will sometimes swing from (1)
support for extreme racial profiling; to (2) a popular shift against racial
profiling; to (3) a responsive "depolicing" of potential crime in racial minority
communities.
For example, in the mid-1990s, cultural identity norms supported Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani' s implicitly race-based campaign to maximize Terry stops.
In the late 1990s, the media began criticizing the NYPD, identifying racial
profiling as an underlying cause of police brutality. Consequently, the NYPD
refrained from policing racial minorities at the Puerto Rican Day Parade in
June 2000, resulting in sexual assaults of at least fifty-seven women.
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TERRY'S "SEESAW EFFECT"
L Introduction
Several voices have been heard recently .... It is time, they say,
to leave aside the obsession with "identity politics" . ...
The
solution is not to abandon the 'cultural' struggle to go back to
"real" politics.
3

Cultural2 context matters.

1. ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY:

TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS xviii (2d ed. 2001) (prefacing hegemony theory's
classic). LaClau & Mouffe' s quote debunks reading identities as mere "wounded attachments."
See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 61 (1995) (critiquing "identity politics"). Western
empistemology intrinsically carries identity norms. "Identity" is a discursive construct, but
discourse's objects "actually do experience pain and suffering." ANNA MARIE SMITH, LACLAU
& MOUFFE: THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC IMAGINARY 61 (1998) [hereinafter SMITH, RADICAL
DEMOCRATIC] (explicating discourse theory); see also JUDITH BUTLER ET AL., CONTINGENCY,

HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY 145 (2000) (critiquing Zizek's "universal lack" thesis by asking
"'which specific content has to be excluded so that the very empty form of ["universal" identity]
emerges ... ?' ).

2. For purposes of this Article, "culture" is the collection of meanings for events,
identities, etc., circulating in a particular context. Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced
FourthAmendment: A CulturalStudy of the Drug War, RacialProfilingand Arvizu, 47 VILL.
L. REV. 851, 855-58 (2002) [hereinafter Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment]
(defining "culture," critiquing drug war); see also FRANCIS MULHERN, CULTURE/METACULTURE
xiii (2000) (finding cultural representations in newspapers, television, and motion pictures);
Cary Nelson et al., CulturalStudies: An Introduction, in CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 5 (Lawrence
Grossberg et al. eds., 1992) (defining culture as "a way of life... and a whole range of cultural
practices"); Stuart Hall, Introduction,in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 1, 2 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997) [hereinafter REPRESENTATION] (defining
culture as "the production and the exchange of meanings.. . between the members of a society
or group"). Cultural norms instantiate, and are a site of struggle over, social power. Austin Sarat
& Johnathan Simon, Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal
Scholarship, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW: MOVING BEYOND

LEGAL REALISM 1, 13 (Austin Sarat & Johnathan Simon eds., 2003) [hereinafter CULTURAL
ANALYSIS] (linking culture "questions of social stratification, power, and social conflict").
Hence, culture is "a continuing tug-of-war between the actual and the possible." ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 219 (2000) (defining culture's dialectic).
Culture affects law and law affects culture. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, in CULTURAL
ANALYSIS, supra, at 37, 40-47 (defining law, culture co-constituitive); see, e.g., STEVEN
BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003)

(tracing representations Latinas/os).
3. Recent identity theory emphasizes the cruciality of context. See Frank Rudy Cooper,
Understanding "Depolicing": Symbiosis Theory and CriticalCulturalTheory, 71 UMKC L.
REv. 355, 356 (2002) [hereinafter Cooper, Understanding "Depolicing"](explaining "why a
practice develops in some places but not others even though the relevant identities are the
same"); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
1257, 1265-68 (1997) (showing context's identity effects); see, e.g., Robert S. Chang & Jerome
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Nonetheless, at times scholars mistakenly presume legal doctrines4 produce
fixed results. In fact, doctrines always produce a range of potential law
enforcement practices.' The choice of a particular enforcement practice is
influenced by the cultural context in which it occurs. This context is most
influenced by a community's cultural identity 6 norms, evidenced by
McCristal Culp, Jr., After Intersectionality,71 UMKC L. REV. 485, 489 (2002) ("Oppression
or subordination cannot be understood outside of the context in which it occurs."); Nancy
Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between
SubordinatingSystems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251,280 (2002) (summoning "detailed, historicized,
and context-specific inquiries into the relationships among systems of oppression" revealing
"their mutually reinforcing effect"); Darren Leonard Hutchinson, New Complexity Theories:
From Theoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 UMKC L. REV. 431, 442 (2002)
("[O]ppression is fluid and contextual .. ").
4. By "legal doctrine," I mean the controlling judicial statements of what the law allows
and disallows. See Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes Toward a
NonskepticalApproach to Legal/CulturalAnalysis, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at
144 n.21 (distinguishing "formal legal rules and procedures," broader cultural studies "law")
(citations omitted).
5. By a "law enforcement practice," I mean the policy- official or defacto, and in general
or on a particular occasion - whereby those who apply the doctrine shall place themselves at
a particular point on the continuum between allowed and disallowed actions.
6. By "identity," I mean the elements of the continuum of "identity negotiation": (1) "self
identity" - the individual's sense of who she is in relation to others; (2) "attributed identity" others' perceptions of who an individual is; (3) "performance practices" - the concrete
"signaling" behaviors individuals use to "perform" their identities in ways that make their self
and attributed identities consistent; and (4) "cultural identity norms" - assumptions as to the
implications of particular categories of identity circulating in popular culture that people might
utilize to articulate the meaning of their own and others' identities. See Cooper, Understanding
"Depolicing", supra note 3, at 357-58 nn.13-14 (defining identity); see, e.g., Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELLL. REV. 1259, 1261 n.2 (2000) (defining
"self identity," "attributal identity," and "working identity"); Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and
White: Cultural Approaches To Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 671 (2001)
(showing identity negotiated between officials, neighbors, individual); Carla Jones & Ann Marie
Leshkowich, Introduction:The GlobalizationofAsian Dress, in RE-ORIENTING FASHION: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF ASIAN DRESS 22-24 (Sandra Niessen et al. eds., 2003) (defining
"performance practices": synthesizing Pierre Bourdieu's, Michel de Certeau's "practice theory"
insights into individuals' everyday counter-normative activities with Judith Butler's identity
"performance" insights into individual bodily presentation). See generally PIERRE BOURDIEu,
DISTINCTION: ASOCIALCRITIQUE OFTHE JUDGEMENT OFTASTE (Richard Nice trans., Harvard
University Press 1984).(1979) (describing everyday class identity practices); JUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE:

FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY

(1990)

(initiating

performativity theory); MICHELDE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICEOFEVERYDAY LIFE (Steven Rendall
trans., 1984) (describing everyday practices circumventing official rules). Throughout, identity
remains "intersectional," in that race, gender, class, sexual orientation, religion, and other
categories are inextricably intertwined. See, e.g., Evelyn Nakano Glenn, From Servitude to
Service Work: HistoricalContinuitiesin the RacialDivision of Paid Reproductive Labor, 18
SIGNS 1, 8-9 (1992) (arguing U.S. economy segmentation forced Women of Color into domestic
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discourses7 articulating' the cultural significance of policing methods
prevailing at a given time in a given place. 9 These "cultural identity norms"
include the representations of the meanings of specific categories of identity
that influence the background assumptions people use when interpreting
behavior.10
service jobs, reinforced white women's domesticity).
7. "Discourses" are stories describing the meaning of a set of events or ideas. See KEY
CONCEPTS INCULTURALTHEORY 117 (Andrew Edgar & Peter Sedgwick eds., 1999) [hereinafter
CULTURAL THEORY] (defining "discourse" as "ways of speaking about the world"). John
Hartley defines "discourse" as:
both a noun and a verb .... the interactive process and the end result of thought
and communication .... Discourses are structured and inter-related; some are...
'more obvious' than others .... Thus discourses are power relations. Textual
analysis can... follow the moves in this struggle, by showing how particular texts
take up the elements ofdifferent discourses and articulate them (that is, 'knit them
together').
JOHN HARTLEY, COMMUNICATION, CULTURALAND MEDIA STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 73-75
(3d ed. 2002). Discourses "rule[] in" certain viewpoints and "rule[] out" other viewpoints.
Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation,in REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 44 (describing
discourse analysis); see, e.g., Michael J. Pastor, Note, A Tragedy And a Crime?: Amadou
Diallo,Specific Intent, andthe FederalProsecutionof Civil Rights Violations, 6 NYU J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 171, 193-94 & n.26 (2002/2003) (describing discourse and noting the difficulty
with prosecuting racial profiling police misconduct when Mayor denies problem).
8. I use the term "articulation" in a specialized manner. I mean the way an authoritative
telling of an event seeks to create a unified and comprehensive idea out of the elements of the
event, which are necessarily incommensurable and subject to contradictory readings. LACLAU
& MOUFFE, supra note 1, at x (defining "hegemony" political articulations seek); see, e.g.,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxviii (Kimberle
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY] ("[Tihe Court's rulings with
respect to race may more plausibly be deemed a result of a tactical political choice among
competing doctrinal possibilities, any one of which could have been legally defensible.");
Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 860 (defining articulation
methodology "map[ping] the context"); see also Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in
REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 44 (explicating discourse effects); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race,
Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" Was a "War on
Blacks", 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 430 (2002) ("The definition of crime and the
formation of the consensus results from a semiotic process of articulation.").
9. See Jack L. Daniel & Anita L. Allen, Newsmagazines, Public Policy, and the Black
Agenda, in DISCOURSE AND DISCRIMINATION 23, 25 (Geneva Smitherman-Donaldson & Teun
van Dijk eds., 1988) (declaring that "the mass media help focus our attention on specific
problems and public policy issues, that is, set the public agenda").
10. Cultural identity norms are more than mere identity stereotypes. They are more general
norms about how to think about identity. They are a resource people draw from, but in a
composite and very context specific way, when determining the implications of a person's
identity status. While cultural identity norms are fluid, we know that generalized antiracial
minority sentiment is a norm in most communities in this country. See, e.g., JODY ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OFBEING BLACK IN AMERICA 135
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In reviewing how cultural context matters, consider the stop and frisk
doctrine of Terry v. Ohio." The U.S. Supreme Court defines a stop as a brief
interference with one's freedom of movement, solely for purposes of
dispelling reasonable suspicion of criminality. 2 It defines a frisk as a "pat
down" of a suspect's outer clothing, including "the area of the groin," solely
for purposes of discovering weapons.' 3
This Article demonstrates the relationship between doctrine, identity norms,
and enforcement practices by analyzing Terry's jurisprudence and subsequent
impact. It concentrates on the Terry Court's reasons for allowing stops and
frisks whenever an officer has "reasonable suspicion" a crime may be afoot. 4
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures and
requires "probable cause" before issuance of a warrant preapproving a search
or seizure. The Terry decision implicitly overturns Camara v. Municipal
Court,5 which applies a "balancing test," or mere reasonableness inquiry, to
municipal housing inspections. The Camaradecision explicitly forbids the
application of the mere reasonableness test to criminal investigations. 16 The
Terry opinion alters the Fourth Amendment by making the scope of the
intrusion, rather than its purpose, the measure of whether a search or seizure
is tested for mere reasonableness or for the more stringent standard of
probable cause. That is the "scope continuum" view of the Fourth
Amendment. The result of the Terry Court's application of a mere
reasonableness inquiry to stops and frisks of limited scope is to limit scrutiny
of officers' decisions, granting them virtually unfettered discretion."'
(1997) ("[T]he Black stereotype is established in children's memories before children develop
the cognitive ability to critically evaluate and decide on the stereotype's acceptability.");
BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BuT NOWISEE 1 (1998) (dubbing white prejudice's invisibility
"transparency phenomenon"). Most importantly, people often act in contradiction of their
consciously held beliefs because of the cultural identity norms that influence them. See, e.g.,
SMITH, RADICALDEMOCRATIC, supranote 1,at 57 ("Political subjects may think one thing, state
another, and act in yet another manner altogether.").
11. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. A "stop" occurs when an officer briefly restrains a suspect's freedom to a degree less
intrusive than an arrest, which would require probable cause. See id. at 22 (identifying stop
basis).
13. Id. at 10 & n.13 (defining frisk).
14. See id. at 20-21 (defining test).
15. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
16. See id. at 535 (explicitly forbidding application of the "balancing test" to criminal
investigations).
17. Some scholars assert that Terry's approval of stops and frisks is uncontroversial because
many officers have long engaged in the practices under state law. Nevertheless, those stops and
frisks lacked the stamp of Fourth Amendment approval the Court has now conveyed. Before
Terry, the Court did not allow the application of a reasonableness standard to criminal
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The Terry doctrine's grant of unfettered discretion effectively places law
enforcement practices on a seesaw. A seesaw is a playground toy balancing
a plank on a fulcrum. Two children sit one on each end of the plank. They
take turns bouncing up and then down.
Without constitutional limits on police discretion, officers may bounce
between over-enforcement and under-enforcement in exercising their Terry
powers. The Terry doctrine's "seesaw" effect, therefore, is in its tendency, in
certain cultural contexts, to shift from (1) popular support for an extreme form
of racial profiling; to (2) a "bounce," whereby popular discourse becomes
dominated by calls for police reform; to (3) an officer response of
"depolicing" a racial minority event or community by means of refusal to
proactively investigate potential crimes. Thus, Terry's grant of excessive
officer discretion creates the potential for a seesaw from extreme racial
profiling to depolicing. 8
Particular cultural contexts are required to activate that potential. Consider
the way in which the 2000 New York City Puerto Rican Day Parade
investigations. See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the
Supreme Court's Conference, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 749,753-54 (1998) [hereinafter Barrett,
Deciding] (reporting Justices originally assumed stops and frisks required probable cause and
exigency); Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourthAmendment, supranote 2, at 883 n.213 (criticizing
notion that "we got something" merely because Terry holds the Fourth Amendment applies to
stops and frisks); Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Reply to Professors
Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1998) (noting Fourth Amendment
reasonableness was previously "a redundant way of saying a 'warrant based on probable
cause"'). I am not alone in criticizing the Terry Court's application of mere reasonableness to
seizures and searches in criminal investigations. See Sundby, supra, at 1135 ("[P]robable cause
should be viewed as a norm for a 'reasonable' search or seizure.").
Akhil Reed Amar claims Terry acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard implicates race, but one wonders whether he had read the end of the opinion. Compare
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097,
1099 (1998) (claiming that Terry is racially sensitive), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 81 (denying that
the exclusionary rule could deter race-based police harassment). Amar is correct that Terry
extends the reach of the Fourth Amendment beyond obvious arrests and "full blown" searches.
Yet the opinion provides scant consolation to victims of race-based stops and frisks. Compare
Amar, supra, at 1098 (applauding reasonableness's flexibility), with Tracey Maclin, Terry v.
Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion,72 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
1271, 1287 (1998) (decrying Court's abandonment of poor and minority suspects).
18. Racial profiling is the categorization of racial minorities as suspicious based on their
identity group status. See, e.g,. Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourth Amendment, supra note 2,
at 869-76 (discussing racial profiling). Depolicing is police officer refusal to investigate
potentially suspicious behavior in a racial minority community or at a racial minority event. See
Cooper, Understanding "Depolicing",supra note 3, at 357-64 (discussing depolicing). As
Terry's seesaw effect demonstrates, racial profiling and depolicing are poles of the same
continuum of enforcement practices.
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("Parade") reflects Terry's seesaw effect. During the parade, NYPD officers,
most of whom were racial majorities, refused to intervene while rampaging
men, most of whom were racial minorities, sexually assaulted at least fiftyseven women. 9 For seven years prior to the Parade, the administration of
Mayor Rudolf Giuliani had conducted an experiment in fully utilizing Terry
doctrine. Prior to the Parade, the administration was intensely criticized by
the press for promoting the harassment of racial minority men by the police."z
In the early 1990s, Giuliani garnered popular support for a policing program
that applied racial profiling to the use of Terry stops.2 ' In the late 1990s,
however, incidents of brutality against racial minorities by the NYPD caused
the City's media to switch sides, which led to a popular consensus against
racial profiling. 2 Officers acknowledged that the discourse shift incentived
them to depolice the Parade sexual assaults. 3 Accordingly, the NYPD's
depolicing of the Parade should be seen as the end product of Terry's seesaw
effect.
The goal of this Article is to convince scholars to investigate the ways in
which both the cultural contexts in which identity norms circulate and the
popular discourses about police methods lead to particular enforcement
practices. To that end, Part II describes the concept of cultural identity norms
and shows how changes in cultural context can lead to a shift in enforcement
practices. Part Um demonstrates that the Terry decision's formalistic review
of stops and frisks improperly permits extreme forms of enforcement, such as
racial profiling and depolicing. Part IV explains the first stage of Terry's
seesaw effect: how the cultural context of early 1990s New York City allowed
its mayor to convince people to support aggressive race-based policing. Part
V traces the second stage of Terry's seesaw effect: how incidents of NYPD
brutality caused a popular shift in attitudes and a demand for police reform.
Part VI details the third stage of Terry's seesaw effect: how the NYPD
responded by depolicing the Parade. Part VII concludes.

19. David Barstow & C.J. Chivers, A Volatile Mixture ExplodedInto Rampage in Central
Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at Al (describing events surrounding Puerto Rican Day
Parade assaults).
20. See Cynthia Cotts, Press Clips, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 20, 1999, at 32 (describing
incidents of racial profiling and connecting them to Giuliani's policies).
21. See Greg Smith, NYPD Hit on Stop-And-Frisk Report: Minorities Targeted, DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 1, 1999, at 3 [hereinafter Smith, NYPD Hit] (reporting disparities).
22. See Graham Rayman, Report Shows Who Cops Stop, NEWSDAY, Dec. 1, 1999, at A3
(reporting prior criticism).
23. See Joyce Purnick, Park Rampage Stirs Anguish on 2 Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2000, at B I (reporting police explanations).
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II. Method: Analyzing the Effects of Cultural Identity Norms Upon
Enforcement Practices
[Gireater attention to competing narrative and interpretive
practices offers the best opportunityfor addressingthe legacy of
racism in the United States.24
Cultural context matters because it creates the assumptions upon which
enforcement practices will be based.
Terry's seesaw effect is possible because of the operation of cultural
assumptions about the implications of specific categories of identity. My
general goal for this Article is to convince scholars to attend to the ways
cultural context affects the translation of a doctrine into an actual enforcement
practice. To that end, this Part describes a method for analyzing how
prevailing understandings about identity affect law enforcement practices.
A. Cultural Identity Norms
"Who needs identity?"25 Everyone. Identity is the guidance system we use
when navigating the maze of objects, people, and events we encounter. To
understand how identity might affect the ways the police apply legal doctrine,
I will briefly outline a model for understanding identity. My model
distinguishes between aspects of an individual's day-to-day performance of
"identity negotiation."26 These aspects include: (1) "self identity," the
individual's sense of who she is in relation to others; (2) "attributed identity,"
others' perceptions of who an individual is; (3) "performance practices," the
concrete "signaling" behaviors an individual uses to "work" her identity so as
to render both her self and attributed identities consistent; and (4) "cultural
identity norms," assumptions about particular categories of identity circulating

24.

CARL GUTItRREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC,

AND INJURY 3 (2001) (calling for narrative analysis).
25. Stuart Hall, Who Needs 'Identity?', in IDENTITY: A READER 15-16 (Paul duGay et al.

eds., 2000) (describing subjectivity versus identity debate).
26. We can also explain identity by distinguishing "structural positions" - the ways an
individual's categories of identity position her within social hierarchies that influence the
tendencies of social institutions - and "subject positions" - the ways discourses articulating
the meanings of structural positions provide individuals with means of explaining their place
in the world to themselves. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 1, at 113 (defining discursive
identity formation); SMITH, RADICAL DEMOCRATIC, supra note 1, at 56-59, 63-70 (contrasting
structural, subject positions).
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in popular culture that 27an individual uses to articulate the meaning of her own
and others' identities.
As one might guess, "self identity" is our internal perception of who we are
in relation to the world.2" While we become aware of and express our self
identity by means of the "voice" inside our heads,29 we form that sense of self
through our interactions with others.3" Our self identity is inherently34
33
32
3
"intersectional." Experiences of gender, 1 race, class, sexual orientation,
27. See Carbado & Gulati, supranote 6, at 1261 n.2 (defining "self identity" and "attributal
identity").
28. Id. (defining "self identity"); see alsoCooper, Understanding"Depolicing", supranote
3, at 357 n.13 ("'Self-identity' is 'how we define and perceive ourselves."') (quoting Carbado
& Gulati, supra note 6, at 1261 n.2).
29. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT xvi (2d ed. 1993) (analogizing "voice" to "core of the self").
30. See id.(identifying feminist relational psychology developmental model based on intersubjective relationships rather than autonomous agency); see also Anita Christina Butera,
Assimilation,PluralismandMulticulturalism: The PolicyofRacial/EthnicIdentity in America,
7 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001) (arguing that individuals base self-identity on the
"mainstream definition of race/ethnicity").
31. Gender is the social meaning attributed to differences associated with our biological sex
characteristics. We are inculcated with senses of the implications of our own and other people's
gender prior to our development of individual agency. See BLACKMEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY 425 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999) ("People who are body-coded female cannot
experience their personhood outside of the social construction of gender .. "); Kay Deaux &
Abigail J. Stewart, Framing Gendered Identities, in HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
WOMEN AND GENDER 84 (Rhoda K. Under ed., 2001) (arguing children cannot select their
gender identity).
32. "Race" is commonly understood as the biological difference between groups from
different continents: Caucasian, Negroid, Asian, Indian (First Nation). MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s,
at 55 (2d ed. 1994) (exploring how concepts of race are created and changed). The difference
is usually judged on phenotypical characteristics such as skin color, hair, and facial features.
Id. While the notion of a genetic difference between races has been discredited, that is not to
say that as a matter of social reality, race does not have enormous significance. Id. at 72.
In certain contexts, individuals may prioritize other aspects of their identity, such as gender,
sex orientation, class, religion, et cetera, but even those priorities are subject to the value and
meaning attached to specific racial identities. Because of the way racial formation has been
constructed in the United States, whites have often been able to forget their race in both political
movements and daily life, while racial minorities have not been able to do so. As Grace
Elizabeth Hale puts it,
Central to the meaning of whiteness is a broad, collective American silence.
The denial of white as a racial identity, the denial that whiteness has a history,
allows the quiet, the blankness, to stand as the norm. This erasure enables many
to fuse their absence of racial being with the nation, making whiteness their
unspoken but deepest sense of what it means to be an American.
GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH,
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and so on, are indivisible.35 Finally, our self-identity changes over time
according to our cultural context.36
"Attributed identity," on the other hand, includes the set of others' initial
assumptions about us based upon a society's categories of identity.37 That is,
people attribute implications to a person's status as a member of a particular
identity group. People base those attributions on stereotypes.

1890-1940, at xi (1998) (explicating the "Jim Crow" system). The ability of whites in the
United States to forget they have a race is itself an aspect of racial formation. Further, other
racial groups in the United States tend to get subsumed within the black/white dichotomy, but
are subject to their own complex processes of racial formation. See generally Ramon
Grosfoguel & Chloe Georas, "Coloniality of Power" and Racial Dynamics: Notes Toward a
Reinterpretationof Latino Carribeansin New York City, 7 IDENTITIES 1 (2000) (comparing
treatment of Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans in New York City).
33. An economic class is "any group of people who have more or less similar goods,
services, or skills to offer for income in a given economic order and who therefore receive
similar financial remuneration in the marketplace. One's economic class position determines
in major measure one's life chances, including the chances for external living conditions and
personal life experiences." WILLIAM JUIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
ix (2d ed. 1980) (arguing class supersedes racial determination of people's life chances). On
an everyday level, we recognize people's economic class based on their tastes in dress, art, and
so on. "Tastes" in culture are the product of social upbringing and education. BOURDIEU, supra
note 6, at 2 (developing a theory of how class background is determinative of people's tastes
in things ranging from art to types of foods). Thus, the hierarchy of culture corresponds with
a hierarchy of consumers. Id. at 1-2. Tastes function as a way of "legitimating social
differences." Id. at 7.
34. Sexual orientation, or sexual minority status, or being Queer, is the state of being
perceived as gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered. It is like gender in that it is a social
construction based on perceived inherent difference. See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond
Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,Multidimensionality, and
Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarshipor Legal Scholars as CulturalWarrior,75 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1409, 1446 (1998) (describing sexual orientation). See generallyFEAR OFA QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (collecting
QueerTheory scholarship); PLAYING WITH FIRE: QUEER POLITICS, QUEER THEORIES (Shane T.
Phelan ed., 1997) (collecting QueerTheory); Symposium, InterSEXionality: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on Queering Legal Theory, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1129 (1998) (applying Queer
theories to sex, gender, sexual orientation, marriage, legal theory).
35. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:Intersectionality,Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991) (defining,
applying intersectionality).
36. See generally Deaux & Stewart, supra note 31 (discussing gender's fluidity).
37. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1261 n.2 (describing "attributal identity");
Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourthAmendment, supranote 2, at 874-75 & nn. 159-60 (describing
African-American men's attributed identities); Cooper, Understanding "Depolicing", supra
note 3, at 369-70 (discussing simultaneous conflicting attributed identities of Asian males);
Kwan, supra note 3, at 1288-89 (describing Asian men's attributed identities).

844

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:833

We attempt to make our self and attributed identities consistent by
"signaling" how we wish to be perceived. 8 The process has been described
as the way people "work" their identity.39 Carbado and Gulati's "working
identity" thesis is instructive. Carbado and Gulati contend that all workers,
but especially people of color, face a potential conflict between their own
senses of self identity and the "attributed identity"n" they must convey to
succeed professionally.4 For example, Carbado and Gulati consider an
individual who is asocial by nature, working at a law firm in which a criterion
for success is being perceived as social and collegial. 2 Hence, a conflict
emerges between his self and attributed identities.4 3 The worker must
negotiate that conflict." He has two basic choices: (1) compromise by
socializing, or (2) remain consistent with his identity and try to succeed in
other ways.45 In either case, he is "working" his identity by signaling his
degree of willingness to conform to workplace norms. 6
The last aspect of my model for understanding identity is the "cultural
identity norm." Because the way we "work" our identity - including the way
police interpret identity - necessarily draws from the preexisting reservoir
of cultural identity norms, we must link identity negotiation to cultural identity
norms. "Cultural identity norms" are the set of prevailing popular
38. See Carbado & Gulati, supranote 6, at 1261 n.2 (hypothesizing individual's desire to
be deemed funny).
39. While other scholars refer to this aspect of identity negotiation as "working identity"
or "performativity theory," a preferable description is "performance practices." By performance
practices, I mean the actual behaviors that express our identities. See Jones & Leshkowich,
supra note 6, at 24 (defining "performance practices"); see also Carbado & Gulati, supra note
6, at 1261 n.2 (describing individual's attempted witty reputation, negotiation between self,
attributed identities); Jonathan Kahn, What's in a Name? Law's Identity Under the Tort of
Appropriation, 74 TEMP. L. REv. 263, 264 (2001) (redefining identity-negotiation through
privacy rather than equal-protection); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and
Group PortraitsofRace and Sexual Orientation,43 UCLAL. REv. 263 (1995) (arguing man's
particular gay identity negotiates personal qualities, assumptions chosen community).
We must emphasize identity-defining practicesbecause even an abstract understanding
of "signaling" requires instantiation in concrete behaviors. Those practices are limited by what
we can imagine: "Even improvised performances interact with audience expectations; they may
challenge or startle us, but they do so by engaging us through shared understandings." See
Jones & Leshkowich, supra note 6, at 23 (describing how "performance in fact is highly
structured work").
40. "[H]ow others define and perceive us." Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1261 n.2.
41. Id. at 1261 (describing thesis).
42. Id. at 1263, 1267 (providing example of working identity).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1264, 1267.
45. Id. at 1264-65, 1267.
46. id. at 1266-67.
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assumptions about categories of identity existing at a given moment and a
given place. The implications people attribute to an individual from a
particular social group are based on assumptions about particular identity
characteristics, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, class, or religion.4 7
These representations are in flux and compete to be perceived as the "common
sense" interpretation.4" When the predominant cultural identity norm in a
community presents a negative characterization of a particular group, we
should expect members of that group to have to "work" against those negative
identity attributions.
Understanding how cultural identity norms operate helps us understand
how cultural context affects the translation of doctrine into a particular
enforcement practice. First, there is a connection between the existence of
"certain default positions" - created by cultural identity norms - the
specific stereotypes, the attributed identities, racial minorities and women
encounter in interacting with the police.4 9 If predominant cultural identity
norms associate racial minority men with crime, then we would expect police
officers to operate based on that assumption. The identities attributed to
individuals, therefore, emanate from the realm of cultural identity norms.5 °
Second, the enforcement of the law is not distinct from the processes of
identity formation; it is influenced by and influences cultural identity norms.
A law or particular enforcement practice contains both explicit and implicit
prescriptions for how people should interact. Laws and enforcement practices
delineate what is inappropriate behavior, thereby identifying "bad" actors.
Accordingly, first-year law students are taught that criminal law is
distinguished from civil law by its stamping the convict with "community
condemnation."'" Law's description of the bad actor also defines another

47. See id. at 1268-69 (analyzing how Korean-American might be stereotyped in large law
firm); see also Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 874-75 &
nn. 159-60 (describing prevailing stereotypes of black men).
48. See Mich~le Barrett, Ideology, Politics, Hegemony: From Gramsci to Laclau and
Mouffe, in MAPPING IDEOLOGY 235, 237 (Slavoj Zizeked., 1994) [hereinafter Barrett, Idealogy]
(linking philosophies, Gramscian "common sense"); see, e.g., Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding,
in

CULTURE,

MEDIA,

LANGUAGE

128

(Stuart

Hall

et

al.

eds.,

1980)

(defining

"encoding/decoding" discourse analysis method) [hereinafter Hall, Encoding/Decoding].
49. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1272 (revealing attributed identities' sources).
50. See generally id. at 1268-72 (discussing attributed identities' sources).
51. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) (canonical understanding of criminal law).
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identity: the normal, appropriate, or "good" actor.52 When the cultural identity
norms promoted by certain laws and enforcement practices ignore the true
nature of certain social groups, those laws and practices render the true
experiences of those groups invisible.53 For that reason, understanding the
cultural context in which police administer Terry stops requires that we
understand how the doctrine, as administered, implicitly articulates the
meaning of particular categories of identity.
Finally, relevant for our purposes is the way certain groups are associated
with a criminal disposition. As a general matter, the cultural norms of a place
might prioritize stopping crime by any means necessary or they might
prioritize protecting civil liberties. Specifically, the cultural norms of a place
might associate racial minorities with crime or they might consider racial
minorities to be victims of overpolicing. As I will discuss, early 1990s New
York City's prevailing cultural norms both prioritized crime prevention over
civil liberties and associated racial minorities with crime. It was that specific
set of prevailing cultural norms that allowed for an extreme form of racial
profiling.
B. How Shifts in CulturalNorms Can Lead to Seesaw Effects
Any legal doctrine creates a range of potential enforcement practices.
Specifically, unless a law enforcement doctrine dictates a very specific
practice on all possible sets of facts, it necessarily affords police some
discretion to choose among potential actions. The doctrine covers a zone of
activities, but some related activities will fall below the zone and others above
it. Under the doctrine's zone of activities lie those that are insufficient to
trigger the doctrine; above the zone, another doctrine may be triggered. For
example, the Fourth Amendment does not cover routine consensual
interactions between police and citizens.54 The Fourth Amendment does cover
52. See MICHAELFOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995) (1978) (showing how modem punishment was developed to teach citizens how
they should think); see also THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT (1987) (applying

Foucault's theories to the U.S. penal system).
53. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 60 (1990)

(Culturally oppressed groups tend to be segregated both socially and economically because
"dominant cultural expressions often simply have little place for the experience of other
groups."). See generally Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory andAntiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing](discussing the
general uncognizability of Black women's joint race and gender claims in employment
discrimination law).
54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1968) (describing Fourth Amendment's
structure).
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Terry stops and frisks, but only scrutinizes them for reasonable suspicion.55
If a stop and frisk turns into a "full blown" seizure and search, the stricter
probable cause doctrine applies. 6 Even within the zone of Terry reasonable
suspicion doctrine, some activities take maximum advantage of the doctrine's
grant of discretion and others take minimum advantage. That range of
advantage-taking within the doctrine's zone of coverage is its "enforcement
practices continuum."
Because doctrines afford discretion within the enforcement practices
continuum, we should consider what might lead to maximum versus minimum
enforcement within the continuum. With respect to police officers, we wish
to understand why they might investigate people with more or less frequency
and vigor in a specific community at a particular time. One influence upon
that choice is the prevailing discourse about the appropriateness of law
enforcement methods, which might support pervasive policing and an anymeans-necessary public sentiment to reduce crime. To the extent police
officers attribute identity based upon cultural identity norms, their choices of
how much and how vigorously to investigate a particular group may vary.
Taken together, articulations as to both the appropriateness of aggressive
versus deferential policing and specific cultural identity norms associating a
social group with crime will constitute a "cultural context continuum"
influencing an officer's exercise of discretion along the enforcement practices
continuum.
Having identified a cultural context continuum, we should also consider
how changes in the cultural context over time might cause a change in the
point at which police officers operate within the enforcement practices
continuum. We might expect that a general cultural shift toward articulating
anti-crime measures as more important than civil liberties, in conjunction with
a shift toward cultural identity norms associating a particular social group with
crime, would lead to more frequent and vigorous investigation of that group.
Similarly, a shift to articulating civil liberties as more important than crime
investigation, along with a group's decreasing association with crime, might
lead to less frequent and vigorous investigation of the group. As will be
detailed later, New York City saw a shift toward anti-crime articulations and
associations of racial minorities with crime in the mid-1990s, then a swing
toward civil liberties articulations and cultural identity norms denigrating
racial profiling as unnecessary in the late 1990s. Hence, at time #1, the
cultural context led NYPD practices to be located at one end of the
enforcement practices continuum, but at time #2 the cultural context led
55. See id. at 20-21 (describing test).
56. See id. at 18-21.
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NYPD practices to be located at the other end. I call that swing from one
extreme point along the cultural context continuum to another extreme point
along that continuum a "seesaw effect."
III. DoctrinalBackground: How Terry v. Ohio DoctrineAllows Racial
Profiling
It is impossible to explore a Court's opinion with complete
neutrality. To attempt to do so would entail considering all the
alternative ways in which the Court might have categorized the
issues in the case, might have told the story behind the litigation,
might have deployed its arguments, and might have respondedto
contending strains in American culture.5 7
Cultural context matters because it is the source of the articulations of the
meaning of constitutional clauses, case precedent, and "the facts" that a legal
doctrine utilizes. 8
What appears to be a neutral process of discerning the right legal rule is
inevitably influenced by what is going on in the culture at the time. After all,
it is people who do the interpreting. This Part of the Article examines the
language of the Terry decision. In the course of that analysis, this Part
considers both the Court's articulations of meanings and the cultural context
in which those decisions are made and applied.
A. The Terry Decision Re-Articulates the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment
Crucial to my conclusion that the Terry Court opened the door to racial
profiling is the fact that the decision constituted a fundamental re-articulation
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In preparation for understanding how
the Terry decision constituted a fundamental shift, it is helpful to pause and
note the way the Terry Court re-characterizes the very language of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court states: "The Fourth Amendment provides that 'the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....

57. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 10 (dismissing pure objectivity).
58. A note about my method. I seek to understand the ways key concepts are articulated.
That requires understanding the parts that exemplify the whole. I do not survey Terry stop
decisions. Accord AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2 (generally alternating theoretical
chapters, chapters closely reading two cases). My method is to conduct "close readings" of key
cases.
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).

2003]

TERRY'S "SEESAW EFFECT"

Note that the Court fails to quote half the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.60
One can easily interpret the Amendment's use of the word "and" as protecting
us against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring warrants based on
probable cause. In fact, many scholars have argued that probable cause should
be the default standard for judging searches and seizures and that
reasonableness should be a rare exception.6 The Terry Court decided not to
take that approach.
In Terry, the Court considered a situation where a white police officer,
McFadden, is patrolling his regular area.6 2 His attention is drawn to two black
men, Terry and Chilton.63 McFadden observes one of the men walk down a
block, peer into a particular store window, keep walking, turn, peer into the
same store window, return, and confer with the other man.' Each man repeats
this process approximately a half-dozen times. 6' A third man, Katz, then joins
the two black men, confers with them, and walks away. 66 The black men then
repeat their peering and conferring approximately a half-dozen times each.67
The black men then walk in the direction of Katz.68 McFadden, fearing the

60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Barrett, Deciding, supra note 17, at 753-54 (noting with approval Terry
Court's initial belief stops and frisks require probable cause); Sundby, supra note 17, at 1135
(calling for probable cause Fourth Amendment norm with limited exceptions).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 6; cf. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1283-85 (noting racial minority
professors' dilemma in discussing hidden racial elements of cases such as Terry).
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
66. Id. The Court's description is illustrative of the way a "Statement of the Facts" is
always itself an articulation of the meaning ofthe underlying elements. Indeed, the unlikelihood
that a white man, the third man, would confer with two black men for innocent reasons played
a crucial, but unacknowledged, role in the decision. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964-68 (1999)
(arguing McFadden suspected Terry, Chilton, and Katz because of their interacial interaction,
that the Court scrubbed race from the opinion).
67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
68. Id.
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black men are planning a robbery, follows them. 69 McFadden comes upon
Terry and Chilton as they are conferring with Katz a block away.7" McFadden
asks the men to identify themselves. 7
When the three men only mumble a reply, McFadden grabs Terry, spins
him around, and pats the outside of his overcoat.7 Feeling a gun, McFadden
seeks to retrieve it, but cannot.73 McFadden then orders the three men into a
store, removes Terry's overcoat, and retrieves the gun as they enter the store.74
McFadden orders the three men to face a wall and begins patting Chilton's
outer clothing.7 5 Feeling a gun, McFadden retrieves it.76 Feeling no gun on
Katz, McFadden does not reach inside Katz's outer clothing.7 7
In the prosecution of Terry and Chilton for illegal possession of a firearm,
the lower courts refuse to exclude the evidence on the theory that stops and
frisks are constitutional if reasonable and need not be supported by probable
cause.

78

In its decision, the Terry Court described a "stop" as an officer's
questioning of someone he suspects of crime that falls between a mere
consensual encounter and an arrest. 79 The Court described a "frisk" as an
officer's patting down of a suspect's outer clothing in search of weapons that
falls between nothing and a "full blown" search.8" The Court held that stops
and frisks are more than mere "petty indignities" and are thereby subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny as searches and seizures. 8 The Court further
held that stops and frisks are not subject to the probable cause requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, but only the general reasonableness requirement.8"
The Court reasoned that stops and frisks are reasonable whenever they (1) are

69. Id.
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 8 (reasoning McFadden "had reasonable cause to believe [the suspects] might be
armed").
79. See id. at 16-20 (distinguishing levels of scrutiny).
80. See id. (distinguishing levels of scrutiny). As an example of a frisk, the Court quotes
a police manual suggesting an officer "feel with sensitive fingers ... the groin and area about
the testicles." Id. at 17 n.13.
81. Id. at 17.
82. See id. at 24.
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warranted at83their inception, and (2) remain within the scope of their
justification.
Citing its newly minted Camara "balancing test," the Terry Court created
the "reasonable suspicion" test. The Court held that a stop is warranted when
(1) a "man of reasonable caution;"8 4 (2) would find facts specific to the
suspect;85 (3) that he could articulate;8 6 (4) "which, taken together with
rational inferences," 87 justify suspecting the person is committing a crime or
is about to do so.88 The Court held that a frisk requires that (1) the stop itself
is valid; 89 and (2) "a reasonably prudent man," granting "due weight" to
"specific reasonable inferences" based on the officer's experience, would be
warranted in believing the suspect is armed and dangerous.9" The Court
summarized the test as follows: "where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous," he may conduct both the stop and the
frisk. 9 '

Based on its new reasonable suspicion test, the Court upheld Terry's
conviction.92 The Court found McFadden's stop valid because a suspect
passing in front of one store window twenty-four times reasonably warrants
further investigation. 93 The Court found McFadden's frisk valid because the
facts suggested a daylight robbery, making it reasonable to suspect Terry

83. Id. at 28-29.
84. Id. at 22.
85. Id. at 21. The specificity requirement could have been read to impose the traditional
"particularization" requirement. The latter requirement limits the scope of a seizure or search

to those persons or things actually associated with a crime.

RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA
L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95-96 (1999) (identifying traditional Fourth
Amendment privacy rules). The Terry doctrine's specificity requirement seemingly does not
require particularization. Cooper, The Un-Balanced FourthAmendment, supra note 2, at 888
(critiquing the allowance of criminal profiles in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10
(1989)).
86. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 22.
89. See id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the
officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to
insist on an encounter, to make aforciblestop.").
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Chilton' s conviction was not at issue because he had been murdered prior to the appeal.
Id. at5 n.2.
93. Id. at 28.

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:833

would be armed.94 Thus, after Terry, officers may stop people on the street
and frisk them whenever they can articulate an objectively reasonable basis
for doing so.95
B. How Terry Createsthe "Scope Continuum" Model of Fourth
Amendment Protection
1. Overturning Camara v. Municipal Court
Prior to Terry, the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for a
criminally-oriented search or seizure to be deemed constitutionally
permissible.96 As of 1966, the Court's decisions suggested that any police
activity constituting a search or seizure must satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
probable cause requirement.9 7 In its groundbreaking Camarav. Municipal
Court decision, however, the Court held that some searches need only satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 98 These searches are
judged by a "balancing test": weighing the government's law enforcement
interests against the individual's privacy interest.99 According to the Camara
Court, the balancing test applies to administrative searches, those conducted
for health and safety pursuant to a regulatory code.' 00 For example, the local
fire department's entry of a building to inspect fire extinguishers pursuant to
a regulatory code would be subject to the balancing test, rather than the
probable cause test. But the CamaraCourt explicitly forbade application of
In light of the Camara
the balancing test to criminal investigations.'
decision, Terry's application of the balancing test to criminal investigations
constituted a fundamental re-articulation of Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence.
The Terry Court could have avoided placing criminal investigations in the
same category as the fire extinguisher inspections Camaraenvisions if it had
held that stops and frisks do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Law
enforcement had sought to distinguish stops and frisks from searches and

94. Id.
95. See id. at 21.
96. See Cooper, The Un-Balanced FourthAmendment, supra note 2, at 880-81 (arguing
pre-Terry Court required probable cause for criminal investigations).
97. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (issuing landlord writ of
prohibition preventing warrantless apartment search and characterizing Frankv. Maryland,360
U.S. 914 (1959), as warrant-probable cause "exception"); see also Cooper, The Un-Balanced
FourthAmendment, supra note 2, at 880-81 (analyzing Camara'slanguage).
98. Camara,387 U.S. at 534-35.
99. Id. at 536-37 (defining the test for determining reasonableness).
100. Id. at 535.
101. Id. (distinguishing criminal from administrative investigations).
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seizures as mere "petty indignit[ies].' ' 2 Indeed, lower courts had
distinguished stops and frisks from searches and seizures."' The Court
rejected that argument, however, holding that searches and seizures exist prior
to the inception of a "technical arrest."'" Instead, the Court declared that to
"stop" is to "accost" and to "frisk" is to carefully explore. °5 Hence, neither
stops nor frisks escape Constitutional scrutiny. 0 6 Accordingly, the Terry
Court did not avoid placing stops and frisks in the same category as fire
extinguisher inspections based on the Fourth Amendment's inapplicability.
Nor did the Court avoid placing stops and frisks in the same category as fire
extinguisher inspections by applying the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
test. The Court reasoned that stops and frisks constitute "an entire rubric of
police conduct - necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat - which historically has not been, and
as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."'0 7 On
that basis, the Court decided not to apply the probable cause test.0 8
Consequently, the Court lifted the Camara prohibition on applying the
balancing test to criminal investigations.' 0 9 Instead, in applying the balancing
test to stops and frisks, the Court created a test of reasonable suspicion." 0
The Terry Court's creation of the reasonable suspicion test fundamentally
altered the Fourth Amendment in ways that opened the door to racial
profiling. In concluding that the Amendment contains an intermediate
category between "nothing" and probable cause, the Terry Court creates a
102. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
103. See id. at 16 n. 12 (citing distinction between frisk and search in State v. Terry, 214
N.E.2d 114, 120 (Ohio 1966)); id. at 17 n.15 (citing distinction between frisk and search in
People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964)).
104. Id. at 19.
105. The Court holds that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the
English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
"search."
Id. at 16.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 20-21 (finding "necessarily swift action" justifies applying reasonableness rather
than probable cause).
110. The Court's reasonable suspicion test asks whether an officer has "observe[d] unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous." Id. at 30.
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continuum of Fourth Amendment scrutiny based on the scope of the search or
seizure.1 1 While the lower court had suggested the Amendment only applies
to searches and seizures, and that when the Fourth Amendment applies,
"'probable cause is essential,"' 12 the Terry Court rejected that "all-or3
nothing" application.'"
"In our view," declared the Court, "the sounder course is to recognize that
the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon
personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of
all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of
reasonableness."'1 4 The Court reasoned that a continuum of Fourth
Amendment scrutiny based on the scope of the intrusion is sensible only if
searches and seizures are measured objectively. The Court's rationale links
the entire "scheme of the Fourth Amendment" to the "imperative that the facts
be judged against an objective standard.""''
2. How the Terry Court's Re-Articulation of the Fourth Amendment
Ignores Racial Profiling
Having noted the fact that the Terry Court overturned the Camaradecision
in order to create the scope continuum, it is necessary to investigate the effects
of that maneuver. The Terry opinion's wide grant of officer discretion and its
establishment of an objective analytical framework accomplish an act of
psychological displacement. 6 In the Court's desire to expand police powers,
it fails to notice that its own citations contradict its reasoning. For instance,
the Court cites the Kerner Commission for the proposition that police do
indeed harass racial minorities."' Nonetheless, the Court imagines race-based
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 17 (identifying "utility of limitations upon the scope").
Id. at 16 n.12 (quoting State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (Ohio 1966)).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18 n.15.
Id. at 21. The Court states as follows:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?
Id. at 21-22 (citation omitted).
116. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 209 (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 1965) (1900) (defining displacement as "[a] psychological process by which ...
indifferent experiences take the place of psychically significant ones").
117. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.l 1 (citing Kerner Commission for proposition police of
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policing as something emanating solely from "certain elements of the police
community."" 8 That isolation of race-based policing within a distinct, and
presumptively small, group of officers contradicts the well-known truth. As
will be discussed in sub-Part C, infra, police officers cannot possibly escape
the lingering prejudice against racial minorities that infects the rest of society.
a) How the Terry Court Expanded Police Officer Powers
It is the Terry Court's analytical framework that prevented the Court from
viewing police prejudice as a proper matter for consideration in fashioning a
stop and frisk doctrine. The Court noted that "[e]ncounters are initiated by the
police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to
a desire to prosecute for crime." ' 19 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
exclusionary rule - whereby evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search
or seizure is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution - "is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no
interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution[s] in the
interest of serving some other goal."' 20 Apparently, the "other goal" includes
"situations where the 'stop and frisk' of youths or minority group members is
'motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image of the
beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who
attempts to undermine police control of the streets."' 12' Because the goal of
humiliation does not require prosecution, "[t]he wholesale harassment by
certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups,
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the
' 22
exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial.'
The Terry Court's reasoning regarding the exclusionary rule reveals an
alternative reading of the Fourth Amendment - one in which its scope
includes issues of racial harassment - the Court wished to avoid. To impact
prejudiced policing, the Court would have needed to either place Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures on a continuum by which constitutionality
is determined by the subjective intentions of the officer or determine that all
stops and frisks are constitutionally infirm on the basis that they are more
2
useful to officers seeking to humiliate than those seeking to prosecute. 1
harass African-Americans).
118. Id. at 14 (denying exclusionary rule's applicability).
119. Id. at 13.
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 15 n. 11 (quoting L. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 47-48 (1967)).
122. Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted).
123. Today, the possibility of a ban on Terry Stops sounds odd to me as I read it. Yet, what
is the result if a suspect refuses to answer questions during a stop? Essentially, the result is the
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Presumably, officers seeking to prosecute have information approaching the
level of probable cause and soon will be able to simply make an arrest.'24
Consequently, the CamaraCourt required criminal investigations to be based
on probable cause. 2' 5 The Terry Court, however, accepted law enforcement's
argument that officers "are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses,
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. 126 The Court
presumably found it difficult to grant those powers if it premised Fourth
Amendment compliance on the intentions of officers rather than the scope of
intrusions. As a result, the Court's goal of expanding law enforcement tools
carries with it the implication of ignoring prejudiced bases for stops and
frisks.
As has been suggested, an alternative reading of the Fourth Amendment
was available to the Terry Court that would have made widespread racial
profiling much less likely. It had previously been assumed that criminal
investigations required a warrant based on a showing of probable cause to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.' 27 Indeed, the notes
from the Terry Court's conference show the Justices initially not only believed
that McFadden had probable cause but that he was constitutionally required
to have probable cause.' 28 A better ruling would have declared probable cause
the default standard for criminal investigations and granted McFadden an
exigency exception because he lacked the time to obtain a warrant before the
likely robbery. Such a ruling would have both affirmed the "mutual

same: "Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled,
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the
needfor continued observation." Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In other
words, at least officially, a stop places officers in the same position they were in before the
stop - waiting for probable cause. Still, an uninformative stop has its uses, for a frisk sends
a "message" that police are keeping an eye on potential suspects. Id. (White, J., concurring).
Those statements by Justice White suggest he wants police to have a harassment power as a
means of social control. If legitimate Terry stops are already close to having probable cause and
illegitimate stops amount to harassment, I'd rather dump the stop power.
124. See Barrett, Deciding, supra note 17, at 785, 797 (citing evidence Terry Court believed
Officer McFadden already had probable cause).
125. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (denying balancing test's
application to criminal investigations).
126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10; see also id. at 20 (expressing concern with officers' "necessarily
swift action").
127. See Sundby, supra note 17, at 1134 (noting pre-Terry ignoring of separate
reasonableness standard).
128. See Barrett, Deciding, supra note 17, at 753-54 (citing Court's initial probable cause
rationale).
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'government-citizen trust"' scholars have identified as a primary Fourth
Amendment principle 29 and properly limited police officer discretion.
b) Why the Terry Court Expanded Police Officer Powers
In light of the Terry Court's substantial re-articulation of the Fourth
Amendment, it is likely that its emphasis on the need to empower police
officers served as an implicit response to the backlash against changes in the
black civil rights movement at the time. Around 1969, research reports and
politically-oriented journals showed dramatic decreases in racial majority
support for racial minority civil rights. 30 This resulted from resistance by
whites to paying the necessary costs to implement programs effectuating real
change in the ways whites and blacks interact,131 as well as a backlash to the
1 32
new mode of civil rights protest represented by the Black Power movement.
Thus, the Terry Court was likely responding, in part, to the national
majority's desire that police powers be extended in response to pervasive fears
of black civil rights riots. More than 170 cities experienced race-based
disorder between 1961 and 1968.133 During the summer and fall of 1967,
when the Court granted certiorari in Terry, the United States experienced
violent black civil rights protests each week. 34 The Martin Luther King riots
followed in one-hundred cities in April 1968, while the Court considered
Terry. 13 This was also the time when Richard Nixon invented his "Southern
Strategy" in which he promoted "law and order" under "a veiled antiblack
appeal."'

136

Research conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s showed a
significant percentage of whites viewed the civil rights riots as evidence that
"'firm police action"' was needed nationwide. 37 That sentiment would
explain Justice Douglas's statement in dissent that "[t]o give the police greater
129. See Sundby, supra note 17, at 1135 (proposing alternative Terry rationale).
130. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 5 (1985) (reviewing
perspectives); see also FAUSTINE CHILDRESS JONES, THE CHANGING MOOD IN AMERICA:
ERODING COMMITMENT? 77-78 (1977) ("There [was] a changing mood in the dominant society.
This changing mood [was] more negative than positive with respect to the aspirations of blacks,
other minorities, and the poor ....
").
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 5 (detailing backlash).
See id. (noting backlash against non-pacifist protest).
Id. at 30.
See id. (describing "unfinished civil rights agenda").
Id.
See id. at 34 (reviewing Nixon civil rights stance).
Id. at 31 (citing statistics) (quoting Angus Campbell & Howard Schuman, Racial

Attitudes in FifteenAmerican Cities,in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)).
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power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.
Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness.
But . . . it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a
constitutional amendment.' ' 31 Justice Douglas's reference to "modem forms
of lawlessness" suggests that the civil rights riots inspired the Terry
majority.139 Thus, given the cultural context of civil rights retrenchment and
calls for greater policing at the time, it is not surprising that the Court chose
to re-articulate the Fourth Amendment."4
C. Why Application of the Terry Doctrine Can Result in Racial Profiling
Seeing why Terry doctrine ignores the potential influence of racism leads
us to the question of precisely how a facially neutral doctrine leads to racially
disparate results. The short answer is that cultural identity norms that promote
stereotypes of racial minority criminality can cause people to misinterpret
equivocal behavior. This sub-Part describes exactly how that process occurs.
That officers are members of a society suffering racism challenges the
veracity of those who claim officers never use racial profiling, 4 ' and calls into
question the effectiveness of Terry doctrine. Scholars argue that nearly
everyone in our society, be they black, white, brown, yellow, or red, has some
degree of prejudice against racial minorities.' Prejudicial social norms are
138. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing abandonment
of probable cause standard) (emphasis added).
139. See id.
140. I am not alone in arguing the Terry decision results from racial politics. Tracey Maclin
argues,
[T]he Terry Court succumbed to pressure to weaken constitutional principle when
it was clear that many politicians, and a large segment of the public, had signaled
their disapproval of the Court's effort to extend meaningful constitutional
protection to those who needed it the most: Poor and minority persons suspected
of criminal behavior.
Maclin, supra note 17, at 1287 (arguing that the Terry Court shifts unjustified stop and frisk
risk).
141. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Colorof Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6, at 51
(citing racial profiling denials).
142. See, e.g., ARMOUR, supra note 10, at 135 ("[T]he Black stereotype is established in
children's memories before children develop the cognitive ability to critically evaluate and
decide on the stereotype's acceptability."). For example, the Reverend Jesse Jackson admits,
"There is nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and
hear footsteps and start to think about robbery and then look around and see it's somebody
white and feel relieved." Paul Glastris & Jeannye Thornton, A New Civil Rights Frontier,U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 17, 1994, at 38 (quoting Rev. Jesse Jackson, Sr.). Armour notes
the disingenuousness of various responses to Jackson's statement. ARMOUR, supra note 10, at
35-60. If a prominent black civil rights activist is affected by stereotypes of who is dangerous,
how can a police officer of any race escape the initial instinct to think racial minorities are more
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too pervasive and strong for43 anyone to avoid without effort, including
members of law enforcement.
Given the ability of stereotypes to continue without an individual's
awareness of their existence, one should ask where prejudiced desires exist.
They continue in the realm of cultural identity norms at the meta-level of
"background social norms,"'" influencing how people perceive the world.
These cultural identity norms provide the source for the assumptions
considered "common sense"; they are the perspectives on identity perceived
as "just the way things are."'' 45 Individuals assume those scripts are true46
because they perpetuate expectations about how individuals will behave. 1
When one belongs to the normative group, one does not question those
norms. 1 47 Consequently, we apply facially neutral standards to "the facts"
based on background social norms of identity.'48 Because race is "socially
constructed," one can subconsciously believe a person's racial characteristics
suspicious than racial majorities? The answer is, he cannot.
143. See ARMOUR, supra note 10, at 134-36 (detailing habit formation of prejudice). In
short, "unless a low-prejudiced person consciously monitors and inhibits the activation of a
stereotype in the presence of a member (or symbolic equivalent) of a stereotyped group, she may
unintentionally fall into the discrimination habit." Id. at 137; see also FLAGG, supra note 10,
at 2 (defining "transparency phenomenon" of white racism).
144. By "background social norms," I mean "norms of reciprocity: norms that sustain what
is perceived to be 'a fair system of cooperation over time."' Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction
Of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2063 (1996) (defining norms).
145. "Common sense" is the prevailing view on the implications of a social event or the
implications of characteristics of individuals. See Jennifer Daryl Slack, The Theory andMethod
of Articulation in Cultural Studies, in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL
STUDIES 117 (David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996) (describing Antonio Gramsci's
concept of hegemony). Within cultural studies, "common sense" is, primarily, the set of ideas
and attitudes that reflect "the ways in which dominant structures and institutions are
acknowledged day-to-day by subordinated groups." Martin Barker, StuartHall, Policing the
Crisis, in READING INTO CULTURAL STUDIES 81, 91 (Martin Barker & Anne Beezer eds., 1992)
(critically reviewing STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS (1978)). The core of the
concept is that common sense is the mechanism by which particular viewpoints are seen as
"natural," and, therefore, as distinct from the interests of a particular group. Hence, "[i]t
would
not be the coherence of Thatcherism that would mark it for success, but its abilityto make itself
appear as common sense, agentless ....
' Id. at 93.
146. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1262 (noting racial minority employees often
feel "pressured to behave in particular ways to avoid discrimination").
147. See FLAGG, supra note 10, at 2 ("Whiteness is the racial norm.... Once an individual
is identified as white, his distinctively racial characteristics need no longer be conceptualized
in racial terms; he becomes effectively raceless in the eyes of other whites.").
148. See id. at 4-8 (describing facially neutral, effectively race-based process). Any lawyer
knows the "facts" are what you make of them, especially when you are in your everyday life,
and not constrained by rules of civil procedure. See id.; see also ARMOUR, supra note 10, at
130 (noting informational inconsistency problem).
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are telling him something relevant about the facts to which one applies a
facially neutral standard. 49
Cognitive behavioral psychology posits that individuals often make
assumptions about people based on their identity categories without
consciously recognizing that they are expecting, for example, a woman to act
"feminine."' 50 Modem Freudian psychology contends that when one's beliefs
contradict public norms of racial equality, subconscious "defense
mechanisms"'' prevent "cognitive dissonance"'52 by preventing conscious
awareness of prejudiced intent.'53 That is, we can think of ourselves as fitting
society's equality norms by repressing into our subconscious any ideas that
contradict those social norms, even as we continue to act based upon our
subconscious prejudiced intent.'54
149. See FLAGG, supra note 10, at 49 (citing studies demonstrating disparately applied
facially neutral standards).
150. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, andEqual Protection:Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336-37 (1987) (describing unconscious process
of categorization as facilitating unconscious stereotyping). We need not ascribe to all principles
of cognitive behavioral psychology in order to accept Lawrence's thesis. The test is whether
Lawrence's argument helps explain what we see in the world. It does.
151. A defense mechanism "disguis[es] forbidden wishes and mak[es] them palatable." Id.
at 331-32 (providing examples of defense mechanisms); see also id. at 326 (describing "strain
theory," in which whites construct a "defense mechanism against the anxiety felt by [holding]
power through means and with motives that they cannot comfortably acknowledge"). Lawrence
identifies defense mechanisms such as repression, denial, introjection, projection, reaction
formation, sublimation, and reversal, which "resolve the conflicts between the primary and
secondary processes [i.e., actual state versus ideal state of affairs] reality." Id. at 331-32. For
a definition of defense mechanisms, see DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-IV, at 751-57 (4th ed., 1994).
152. "Cognitive dissonance" is a tendency to repudiate or downplay information that
contradicts more favorable information about oneself." See Paul Bennett Marrow, Behavioral
Decision Theory Can Offer New Dimension to Legal Analysis of Motivations, 74 N.Y. ST. B.
J. 46, 47-48 (2002) (analyzing motive conceptions).
153. See Lawrence, supra note 150, at 333 (discussing conflict "which arises when an
individual cannot master his instinctive drives in a way that fits into rational and socially
approved patterns of behavior"). Again, we need not ascribe to all principles of Freudian
psychology in order to accept Lawrence's thesis.
154. Subconscious prejudice can show through in the subtle attitudes people display to one
another. Peggy Cooper Davis argues everyday interactions between whites and historically
denigrated racial minorities are haunted by the possibility the white person will commit a
microaggression against the person of color. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, in
CRITICALRACETHEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 169, 170 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter
THE CU7ING EDGE] (describing "incessant" legal system microaggressions against racial
minorities). A microaggression is a small offense in a day-to-day interaction through which one
person expresses his belief that he is better than or takes priority over the other person. See id.
(describing incident reflecting asserted intellectual superiority). The smallness of the offense
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For example, the general social norm might be that people should not wear
oversized and extremely loose-fitting jeans. 55
' And the very small portion of the
population, regardless of race, that sells drugs may have a greater tendency to
wear baggy jeans. 5 6 It may also be a young black male subcultural' 57 norm to
wear baggy jeans.'58 Those facts could lead a police officer to produce a racially
disparate result, the disproportionate stopping of innocent black males, while
consciously intending only to apply a facially neutral criterion, whether one is
wearing baggy jeans. Because whites constitute the majority, however, their
norms will constitute the general norm.'59 If whites tend to act differently than
does not make it less intentional. To believe in one's racial superiority and display that belief
in an interaction expresses a desire for affirmation, and the repression of that belief from one's
conscious awareness does not change the nature of the desire. The display of a subconscious
belief in one's racial superiority may be subtle, but it is also often palpable. As a result, the
racial minority may feel she must perform "comforting acts" as a means of reducing the
likelihood of microaggressions. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 6 (identifying
"working identity" strategies); Camille Nelson, Breaking the Camel's Back: A Consideration
of Mitigatory CriminalDefenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 77
(2003) (summarizing health effects of fighting racism).
It is the subconscious operation of prejudice that makes it invisible, yet simultaneously
omnipresent. See FLAGG, supra note 10, at 2 (defining "transparency phenomenon" of white
racism). As Davis notes, the era of "color blindness" presents a dilemma for the scholar of
identity:
The claim of pervasive, unconscious racism is easily devalued. The charge has
come to be seen as egregious defamation and to carry an aura of irresponsibility.
Nonetheless, the claim is well founded.
Davis, supra, at 170.
155. See, e.g., Christopher B. Gilbert, We Are What We Wear: Revisiting Student Dress
Codes, 1999 BYUEDuC.&L.J. 3,14-15 (1999) (suggesting ideal student dress code prohibiting
oversized jeans, "baggy pants"); accord Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556,
560-61 (D.N.M. 1995) (holding school dress code may prohibit wearing oversized jeans).
156. See Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 561 (associating saggy pants with gang affiliation).
157. "Subcultural norms" are the values and behaviors of a subsection of the culture that
vary from the general norms. See Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law And Economics, The
Culture Of Deindividualization,The ParadoxOf Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 718-19 (1995)
(defining subcultural as "the sameness of perspectives [which] generates a sameness of the
meaning of internal (e.g., ideas) and external things between and among members of the
subculture"); see also DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE (1979) (analyzing
treatment of formation of punk rock subculture).
158. See Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560-61 (conceding wearing "sagging pants are a way for
[the defendant] to identify and express his link with his black identity, the black culture and the
styles of black urban youth").
159. See id. at 561 (finding that although the wearing of baggy pants is a form of expression
for black urban youth, the majority population does not perceive it as such). The Bivens court
finds that the majority of people, necessarily implying white people, associate negative images
with the wearers of baggy jeans. Id.; see also Audain, supra note 157, at 720 (asserting white
males control understanding of cultural norms: "In America, the white male sub-subculture is
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racial minorities, the general norm will be race-specific.' 60 As reasonable
suspicion turns on these differences, Terry stops, therefore, will be based on
violations of the general norms, and will thus constitute both a facially neutral,
majoritarian, 161 principle and a racially disparate form of reasoning with
invidious effects.
The Terry Court's re-articulation of the Fourth Amendment as indifferent to
evidence resulting from police harassment 62 rests on a flawed principle. The
Fourth Amendment's ban on unjustified invasions of privacy exists not only to
free suspects caught by unfair means, but also to deter law enforcement from
trying to unjustifiably infringe upon one's security.'63 To protect people from
unjustified invasions, the Terry Court should have denied or clearly limited the
reasonable suspicion rationale for stops and frisks. The Court's failure to limit
stop and frisk discretion creates the very possibility for the seesaw effect
discussed henceforth.
IV.FirstStage of Terry's Seesaw Effect in New York City: The Rise of
Supportfor Extreme Racial Profiling
In the closing decades of the twentieth century the pursuit of
freedom has come to be overshadowedby a new sense of disorder
andofdangerouslyinadequatecontrols.... [A] reactionarypolitics
has used this underlying disquiet to createa powerful narrative of
moral decline in which crime has come to feature... as the chief
symptom of the supposed malaise.... [Ilt has been a feature of
these developments that they have been targeted againstparticular
socialgroups ratherthan universally imposed.'6
the culture that controls the cultural apparatus").
160. See Audain, supra note 157, at 720-21 (discussing extent to which degree ofdominance
of white male subculture determines cultural norms).
161. But see Valdes, supra note 34, at 1415 (criticizing hidden privilege of majoritarian

system).
162. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967) ("The wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently
complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial.")

(citation omitted).
163. See Mathew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function:The Search For Truth And
The Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarialand InquisitorialJustice Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 185, 188-89 (2002) (arguing Fourth Amendment must value preserving "individual
rights and deterring the police from interfering with them" above moral guilt); David A.
Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2000)
(declaring the exclusionary rule "the Fourth Amendment's chief enforcement mechanism").
164. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 195 (2001) (linking earlier social change, rise of crime control
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Cultural context matters because it is the battleground on which social groups
fight to articulate the varied meanings of identity that inform the legal doctrines
that translate into enforcement practice.
Having demonstrated the Terry doctrine's ample potential for racial profiling,
I will now show how cultural context can activate that potential. The Terry
doctrine's potential for racial profiling is not necessarily activated in every
cultural context. For example, a city with high-ranking political or police
leaders who disapprove of the practice can create a greater risk of harm to the
individual officer caught racial profiling, and a city where the popular consensus
simply prides itself on not being prejudiced will make racial profiling less likely.
Of course, a city where the popular consensus ignores or even supports racebased policing will eventually get what it asks for.
While this Part concentrates on discursive struggles, those struggles spring
from enforcement doctrine. In the early 1990s, Terry stops served as the
NYPD's mode of racial profiling.165 Had the Terry Court chosen to bar stops
and frisks altogether, the NYPD would not have been able to adopt widespread
racial profiling. Further, the Court's bar on Fourth Amendment analysis of
racial pretext, coming as it did in the midst of widespread racial profiling in New
York and elsewhere, implicitly endorsed the practice. Having worried about the
Terry doctrine's potential to cause extreme racial profiling, I now want to turn
to the evidence that New York City did in fact adopt an extreme version of racial
profiling in the mid-1990s.
That evidence is substantial. New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
compiled a report that found that NYPD officers disproportionately stopped and
frisked blacks and Hispanics. " The Attorney General found that in areas where
blacks comprised 26% of the population, they accounted for 50% of the area's
stops. 167 Hispanics, comprising 24% of the population, accounted for 33% of
the stops.168 Whites, however, comprising 43% of the population, accounted for
only 13% of the stops.'69 The figures for Giuliani's pet project, the Street
Crimes Unit (SCU), were even more dramatic: 63% of people stopped by the
unit were black. 7 ° Following the Attorney General's report, investigators for
arguments).
165. See Snith, NYPD Hit, supra note 21, at 3 (reporting race-based nature of stops and
frisks).
166. Rayman, supra note 22, at A3. Officers in New York are required to fill out a UF-250
form in which the officers must describe the circumstances that led them to form "reasonable
suspicion." See id.
167. Smith, NYPD Hit, supra note 21, at 3 (reporting stop and frisk statistics).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board determined that NYPD
officers routinely failed to file paperwork, and thus the official police7
department statistics may have underestimated the extent of racial profiling.' 1
Furthermore, a federal investigation into the SCU also ensued after the highlypublicized shooting by police officers of Amadou Diallo, a black man.'72
Prosecutors found that blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately stopped
and frisked, and that the imbalance could not be explained by crime rates in the
City's racial minority neighborhoods. 173 This Part of the Article examines why
New Yorkers initially supported the mayoral candidate who would eventually
enact such an extreme form of racial profiling.
A. Giuliani'sRacialized Campaign
Consider the 1993 New York City mayoral campaign between black,
incumbent Mayor David Dinkins and white, former United States Attorney
Rudolph Giuliani. A fundamental fact of New York City politics is that
Democrats outnumber Republicans by a ratio of five to one.'74 So why did
Giuliani, a member of the Republican party, win the mayoral election? He won
racial majorities outnumber racial minorities by more than three to
because
75
one.
Giuliani waged political war on blacks and Hispanics by arguing that the
NYPD should be granted greater power to control crime. Giuliani made it clear
he wanted more aggressive policing, stating that those who make New Yorkers
171. William K. Rashbaum, Review BoardStaff FaultsPolice on Stop-And-FriskReports,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at B 1. Several officials acknowledged that officers commonly failed
to fill out paperwork. Id. In 228 cases where a suspect had been frisked, the forms were only
filed out in 135 cases. Id. In fifty-four cases where officers frisked a person, only eighteen UF250 forms were filled out. Id. Most importantly, in 168 cases where an arrest was made, only
thirty-three forms were filed. Id. The Civilian Review Board also found that African
Americans, who comprised 25.2% of New York City's population, accounted for 63.8% of the
people who were stopped and frisked on the street. Id. Hispanics comprised 24.4% of the city's
population and accounted for 23.8% of the stops. Id. Whites accounted for 43.2% of the city's
population but were only 10.6% of the stops. Id.
172. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Detects Bias in Police Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at
Al. A federal investigation was already underway regarding patterns of brutality within the
department and deficiencies in disciplining problem officers. Id. Negotiations between the
prosecutors and the city aimed at avoiding a formal lawsuit dragged on for months. Id.
173. Id.
174. Alison Mitchell, GiulianiZeroing in on Crime Issue; New CommercialsAre Focusing
on Fears ofNew Yorkers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at B3 (describing Giuliani's anti-crime
campaign).
175. This assertion is a matter of logic. If Democrats outnumber Republicans, some
Democrats must have switched sides. Racial minority voters did not abandon Dinkins, so it
must have been racial majority voters who abandoned Dinkins.
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feel threatened "'have to be removed from the streets.' 176 According to
Giuliani, New Yorkers had "'their eyes down"' because of a social malaise
resulting from rampant crime.' 77 The candidate ran a series of commercials
featuring "testimonials of crime-weary New Yorkers."'7 As examples of the
city's deterioration, the ads pointed to the menacing "'squeegee men"' and
promised to crack down on street drug dealers, panhandlers, and homeless
people.'79 With about $1 million more in cash than Mayor Dinkins, Giuliani
flooded the airwaves with images of homelessness and crime. 8 ° Giuliani's
message was rhetorically powerful. Indeed, it was effective although crime had
decreased during Dinkins' term.' 8'
The media noted the race-based nature of Giuliani' s anti-crime appeal. In an
article titled A Race About Race, New York's Newsday declared that Giuliani
was consciously cultivating a "silent majority."' 8 2 Giuliani wanted that majority
to associate Dinkins with favoritism towards blacks.' 83 Dinkins countered by
arguing that the city's racial tensions would have been worse had he not been
mayor"8 and claimed Giuliani failed to campaign in minority neighborhoods.'8 5
Giuliani shrewdly argued that the Reverand Al Sharpton, an extremely
unpopular figure among the city's whites at the time, had been asking black
' Moreover, the candidate secured a
church leaders not to meet with Giuliani. 86
Puerto Rican running mate, self-proclaiming their candidacies a "City of
Fusion" ticket,'87 thereby insulating him from charges of ultra-conservatism.'8 8
Having fought off Dinkins' challenges to his racial politics, Giuliani was free
to link Dinkins to crime. "Crown Heights" became Giuliani's battle cry,
ostensible evidence of Dinkins' "soft on crime" approach.'8 9 The Crown
Heights neighborhood had recently witnessed massive, violent riots by racial
176. Catherine S. Manegold, Giuliani,on Stump, Hits Hard at Crime and How to FightIt,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al.

177. Id.
178. Mitchell, supra note 174, at B3.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Editorial, A Broad Planfor Safe Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1993, at A26
[hereinafter A Broad Plan] ("Most serious crimes dropped during the Dinkins years.").
182. See Michael H. Cottman, A Race About Race, NEWSDAY (New York), June 30, 1993,
at 27 (detailing candidates' implicit race-based arguments).
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Mitchell, supra note 174, at B3.
188. Id.
189. Sam Roberts, A TarnishingReport for the Mayor of New York, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
1993, § 4, at 4.
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minorities in response to a white, Jewish man's hit-and-run killing of a black
child. 9 ° Giuliani contended that he would have quelled the four-day riot sooner
had he been mayor.' 9 ' Giuliani's attacks seemed to suggest that had the Mayor
not been black, the riots would have been quelled sooner.' 92
Dinkins' popularity dropped dramatically when the governor of the State of
New York, Mario Cuomo, ordered a report to determine whether Dinkins should
have responded sooner in the Crown Heights incident.9 3 The order was
probably a deciding factor in sealing Giuliani' s election. 94 Dinkins accepted the
Crown Heights report's conclusions that he should have questioned and
overruled the tactics of his police commanders before the third night of
violence. 195 Afterwards, Dinkins' supporters reasoned that the Governor's
report might have moved the crucial white swing voters to the Giuliani camp.' 96
B. How Liberal Whites Justified SupportingGiuliani's Race-BasedAntiCrime Theme
Giuliani's funding advantage does not adequately explain how he won in a
city where Democrats outnumber Republicans five to one.'97 Giuliani' s victory
is explained by examining why many liberal whites switched from supporting
Dinkins during the previous election to supporting Giuliani. Why would this
presumably non-prejudiced group of whites vote for Giuliani? The answer is
that those white liberals were oblivious to the implicit prejudice in Giuliani's
campaign.
We can consider the failure to predict Giuliani would racially profile in light
of the theory of cultural norms discussed in Part 11. Liberals could not see the
prejudice of Giuliani's political tactics because of the operation of background
social norms. Background social norms lead whites (1) not to think of
themselves as belonging to a race,'98 (2) to think of perspectives they share with
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Put another way, Giuliani implicitly suggested that had the Mayor been white, there
would not have been any favoritism toward the riotous black community. He did not have to
say that explicitly because "[t]he public knows, without having to be told" that anti-crime
policies will be aimed at racial minorities. GARLAND, supra note 164, at 136 (arguing crime
control often hidden racial argument). The author thanks Krystina Lopez de Quintana for
suggesting this implicit argument.
193. Peter Pringle, Riots Report Puts Pressureon Dinkins, INDEP., July 21, 1993, at 12.
194. Todd S. Purdum, The Crown Heights Report: The Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1993, at Al.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Mitchell, supra note 174, at B3.
198. FLAGG, supra note 10, at 2 (defining "transparency phenomenon").
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other whites but not with racial minorities as being race-neutral,' 99 and (3) not
to think of problems primarily faced by racial minorities as part of their own
world. 200 Here, even though overall crime dropped during Dinkins' term as
whites perceived crime as having recently risen. Either of two
mayor, 201many wie
things could explain that disconnect: (1) the media tricked white liberals into
believing overall crime had risen; or (2) crime had only recently moved from
racial minority communities to white communities, causing an actual rise in the
crime rate in white communities. While the media certainly overstated the
comparative prevalence of crime during Dinkins' term, it is the increase in crime
in white neighborhoods that explains why Giuliani's anti-crime theme had
traction with white liberals.
New York City's liberal whites ignored late 1980s crime when it was
concentrated in racial minority communities. Accordingly, liberal whites
honestly believed crime increased overall during the Dinkins era, even though,
at worst, crime rose in white neighborhoods while falling by a greater
percentage in racial minority neighborhoods. Liberal whites adopted a "Not in
My Back Yard" approach to crime without feeling prejudiced because
background social norms allowed them to believe crime was a new problem.
Again, scholars suggest socially empowered groups, such as American whites,
often think of themselves as not belonging to any particular group.2 °2 Because
whiteness is the epistemological... norm in this country, whites have the
privilege of thinking of themselves as having no racial perspective. 2°4 In early
1990s New York City, background social norms allowed whites to ignore crime
while it was merely a racial minority problem without feeling that blindness was
itself a racial perspective.
Because the crime problem was perceived as a new problem, the crime
problem served as a race-neutral justification for supporting Giuliani. White
liberals believed they were responding to Giuliani's anti-crime message rather
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. SeeA BroadPlan, supra note 181, at A26.
202. FLAGG, supra note 10, at 2 (describing "transparency phenomenon").
203. By this term, I mean that using whiteness as a baseline is a presupposition of our
culture. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)
(identifying epistemology with "the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions... and validity").
204. See FLAGG, supra note 10, at 2 (defining "transparency phenomenon"). Moreover, the
exercise of withholding and assigning race is the "pleasure" of race. See Anthony Farley, The
Poeticsof ColorlinedSpace, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND ANEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
97, 99 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) ("Race is a form of pleasure. For whites, it is a
sadistic pleasure in decorating black bodies with disdain."). The pleasure of white privilege is
in having power exercised on your behalf, but being able to deny you have exercised the power
or benefitted from its exercise. See id.
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than his implicitly race-based message. While the candidate's liberal, racial
majority supporters were neither intentionally nor subconsciously prejudiced,
they were normatively prejudiced. After all, "[t]he public knows, without
having to be told," that anti-crime policies will be aimed at racial minorities."
Prevailing cultural identity norms allowed liberal, racial majority voters to
engage in an act of denial whereby they could support Giuliani without thinking
about the fact they were adopting a race-based policy.
C. Drawing ConclusionsAbout New York's Extreme Racial Profiling
I began this Part of the Article by reviewing evidence of the wide racial
disparities in NYPD Terry stops. Racial profiling is the name for such a
department-wide use of race to determine suspicion. The extreme nature of the
NYPD's racial profiling in the mid-1900s was demonstrated by the Attorney
General's report. Federal prosecutors noted that those stop rates cannot be
explained by any racial disparity in crime rates.2 6 My explanation for those stop
rates is that they are a product of racial profiling. New York's cultural context
in the 1990s activated Terry doctrine's potential for racial profiling because
Giuliani' s mayoral campaign exploited a cultural trend calling for crime control.
Giuliani took advantage of the general tendency toward draconian policing
measures by using the Crown Heights Riots and other racial imagery. While
these tactics should have put people on notice that his policies would have
racially disparate effects, liberal whites gave Giuliani his margin of victory.
Thus, the explanation for racial profiling in New York is that Giuliani's
racialized campaign gave him a mandate to adopt an aggressive policing
philosophy inherently susceptible to racial disparity.
V. Second Stage of Terry's Seesaw Effect in New York: The Shift in the
Media's DiscourseAbout RacialProfiling
'[Olne of the most significantpolitical moments... is the point
when events that arenormallysignifiedand decoded in a negotiated
way begin to be given an oppositionalreading'2 7
Cultural context matters because it responds to the enforcement of doctrine
and eventually leads to changes in the way a doctrine is enforced.
The first stage of Terry'sseesaw effect was reached in New York because the
cultural context activated Terry doctrine's inherent susceptibility to racial
205. GARLAND, supranote 164, at 136 (critiquing biologically-based criminology theories).
206. See Weiser, supra note 172, at Al.
207. Hall, Encoding/Decoding, supra note 48, at 138 (providing discourse analysis
framework challenging prevalent communications theory).
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profiling. With that in mind, consider the second stage of Terry's seesaw effect:
the way opinions about extreme racial profiling can generate a shift against the
practice.
This Article has shown how the cultural context of early 1990s New York led
to the adoption of an extreme form of racial profiling. While Terry doctrine is
an invitation to racial profiling awaiting such a cultural context to be activated,
this Part of the Article analyzes why the NYPD' s extreme racial profiling itself
begat a popular shift against it. While New Yorkers originally supported the
City's call for draconian policing practices, high profile cases of police brutality
against racial minorities eroded that support. As Mayor Giuliani refused to
acknowledge NYPD abuses, the popular media switched sides and began
challenging racial profiling. By the time of the Parade, police officers admitted
a reluctance to show force in racial minority communities.
A. The Rise in Criticism of Racial Profilingby the NYPD
From 1993 to 1997, Mayor Giuliani enjoyed acclain for lowering crime rates.
Using his mandate to fight crime by any means necessary, Giuliani's NYPD
conducted an experiment in full utilization of the Terry stop powers. As was
noted in the last Part of the Article, those stops and frisks resulted in an extreme
form of racial profiling. This sub-Part of the Article details two incidents that
led to a shift in the popular consensus from support for Giuliani's anti-crime
campaign to criticism of NYPD racial profiling.
1. The Rape ofAbner Louima
The focus of New York City's citizens on plunging crime rates dissipated
when reports erupted that four New York City police officers, in August 1997,
had tortured Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, "a night security guard from
Jamaica, Queens, [who] was arrested after a scuffle between the police and
revelers leaving a Flatbush Avenue nightclub . . . . During the fighting,
witnesses say, a police officer handed his gun belt to a partner and began
exchanging blows with Mr. Louima.... Investigators said Mr. Louima knocked
Officer Volpe to the ground" and was then arrested. 2" Two other police officers
stopped twice on the way to the station house to beat him, and, at the station
house, took Louima into the bathroom and beat him again."°9 One officer then
anally raped Louima with the wooden handle of a toilet plunger, and chained
Louima in a holding cell.210
208. See Dan Barry, 2D Police Officer Chargedin Attack on Arrested Man, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1997, § 1, at 1.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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"Investigators said that the precinct called for an ambulance for Mr.
Louima.. . more than an hour after [he] was booked .. ." " Although the
ambulance arrived at 6:25 a.m., it "did not leave the station house until 7:58
[a.m.] ...as paramedics waited for police officers... to escort them as they
took Mr. Louima to the hospital. 212 His condition was listed as critical. 1 3 The
first reports indicated that Louima's front teeth were knocked out and that he
had suffered damage to his intestinal track. 2 4 Later, a law enforcement official5
21
said, "'As best we can determine, a denture was knocked out in the attack.'
While denouncing the police officers' brutal actions against Abner Louima,
Police Commissioner Safir also indicated that the incident was an isolated
matter.2 ,6 The administration applauded the unnamed officer who came forward
with information leading to the arrest of the guilty officers. 2 7 The
administration stressed that the incident happened behind closed doors and was
clearly criminal. Painting the incident as a problem of a few deviant officers, the
Mayor claimed the incident was only indicative of the need to psychologically
screen officers during the hiring process.2 '
Critics of the Giuliani administration pointed to his unequivocal support for
the police department as part of the problem. Giuliani seemed to support
fighting crime by any means whatsoever:
[F]rom the beginning of Mr. Giuliani's term the dominant message
to the police was get tough, assert yourself, make your presence felt.
Cops were given bigger guns and pushed to adopt a super-macho
persona. The problem, of course, is that if you unleash the police
without adequate training and without a sophisticated system of
safeguards, you will get a surge in brutality.2 19
The Louima incident caused many people to associate Giuliani's policies with
police brutality.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Michael Cooper, Giuliani Asks for Apologies in Louima Case Reaction, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Cooper, Guiliani].
215. See id.
216. See Bob Herbert, In America, Hear the Blue Wall Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997,
§ 4, at 15.
217. Cooper, Guiliani,supra note 214, at B4.
218. See id. In defending the police department and his administration, Giuliani said, "The
communities of the city have to also not fall into the excessive anti-police rhetoric that some
people would lead them to because that drives the police further away." See Barry, supra note
208, § 1, at 1.
219. Herbert, supra note 216, § 4, at 15.
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Consequently, the Louima incident represents the beginning of the second
stage of Terry's seesaw effect in New York. In the first stage of that effect, New
Yorkers accepted Giuliani's implicitly race-based argument for aggressive
policing. The result was NYPD use of Terry stops for extreme racial profiling.
Fallout from the Louima incident was the first broad-based challenge to the
NYPD's enforcement practices. That challenge would be followed by an
eventual shift from popular support for policing by any means necessary to a
consensus against racial profiling.
2. The Slaying of Amadou Diallo
In February 1999, an unarmed West African immigrant with no criminal
record was shot nineteen times by four police officers in the doorway of his New
York City apartment building.22 ° Diallo had come home from work and
subsequently left his apartment to purchase food, as he often did after work.22'
Four officers of the NYPD Street Crimes Unit - a unit that Mayor Giuliani and
Police Commissioner Safir heralded early in their careers 222 - spotted Diallo
and allegedly determined that he met the description of a serial rapist.223 It is
unclear what happened next.224 We do know that Diallo was a "skinny guy,"

carrying no weapons."' Although police rules explicitly demand that officers
use deadly force only when they fear their lives or the lives of others are in
danger, this team emptied their guns on an unarmed man.226
State Assemblyman Ruben Diaz, who represented the Bronx area, called the
shooting "outrageous" and said it was clear that excessive force was used.227
Francisco Gonzalez, president of the Bronx Puerto Rican Day Parade, said
Bronx citizens lodged numerous complaints each month, claiming they were
stopped and frisked without cause. 228 Two-thirds of those complaints involved
SCU officers. 229 Gonzalez said, "'[P]eople are being stopped for no reason,
thrown against a fence and searched. Their cars are stopped without probable
cause. Sometimes there's vulgar language to people who are just minding their
220. See Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al
[hereinafter Cooper, Officers].
221. See id.
222. See Cooper, Guiliani,supra note 214, at B4.
223. See Cooper, Officers, supra note 220, at Al.
224. See id.
225. See id. When the body was recovered, investigators found Diallo had only a beeper and
wallet on his person. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts Toll on the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al.
229. See id.
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business. What some of the officers are doing is just creating an atmosphere of
fear."' 2 3' Hence, the Diallo incident was connected to the NYPD's aggressive
stop and frisk practices.
In his first reaction to the Diallo slaying, Mayor Giuliani urged people to
" ' He said,
withhold judgment.23
"'We've had terrible mistakes in this city when
people have reacted to rumors and intuitions and feelings .... Let's let the
situation run its course and then let's react to the facts.' ' 232 A reporter from the
New York Times captured Giuliani's reaction best:
With every passing day, Mr. Giuliani struggles to bring a calmer
perspective to the tragedy, to convey convincingly the pain he says
he feels over this loss of life and compassion for the victim's family.
Several times he has imparted heartfelt thoughts, then felt the need
to defensively recite statistics showing that fatal police shootings are
less frequent in New York than in other large cities. His recitation
of statistics seems to linger longer than his words of sympathy. 233
Giuliani's failure to convincingly convey remorse for the Diallo incident made
the Mayor's response an issue in its own right.
The attitude toward Giuliani became hostile as he continually refused to meet
with black community leaders. About three weeks after the fatal shooting,
Giuliani and Police Commissioner Safir attended a religious ceremony at the
invitation of a coalition of African immigrant groups.2" However, the Guinean
Association of America, the United African Congress, and the Reverand Al
Sharpton all distanced themselves from the event because they planned to
continue protests against police brutality.2 35 Major black leaders were not the
only ones who missed the event; Diallo's family and close friends also
boycotted.236 Responding to their boycott, Giuliani said he attended the event
out of respect and said, "Had I not gone, all the race baiters would have said the
Mayor is snubbing the event.... I have gone through this game with the race
'
baiters for too long to fall prey to it."237

230. See id.
231. See Cooper, Officers, supra note 220, at Al.
232. See id.
233. See Dan Barry, A Reopened Divide; Lack of Ties With Black Leaders HindersMayor
After Police Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at Al.
234. See David M. Herszenhorn, Mayor Expresses Regret Over Police Shooting of
Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999, at B3.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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Approximately two months after the event, new police statistics were released

"showing the rate of violent crime creeping up. '238 Giuliani suggested that "the

trend might be the result of a less active police force distracted by the uproar
over... Amadou Diallo. '239 Police Commissioner Safir added, "'I can only
speculate to the fact that the individuals in Street Crime are concerned about
taking enforcement action for being criticized. ' '' 2' After the shooting, the
Mayor and the Commissioner sent the message that the "whole atmosphere"
after the Diallo shooting might have affected police officers' ability to do their
jobs.24' They also suggested that protesters and the media coverage after the
Diallo shooting could sap officers' confidence, dangerously distracting them
from their jobs. Minority officers disagreed, saying, "'We've been telling the
commissioner for years that Street Crimes has been just searching people at will,
all in minority neighborhoods. The reason the arrests are going down is that all
of a sudden, they
have to play by the same rules as everybody else. The
242
Constitution."

The Diallo incident solidified the second stage of Terry's seesaw effect in
New York. Police brutality was blamed on the NYPD's race-based enforcement
practices. There was a gathering public consensus against race-based policing
that reversed implicit support for race-based policing during the first stage of
Terry's seesaw effect in New York. Furthermore, Giuliani's response to
criticism of the Diallo incident prefigured the third stage of Terry's seesaw
effect: He argued criticism of the police would lead to underenforcement of
laws.
B. The Media Switches Sides
The second stage in Terry's seesaw effect in New York was reached when it
became clear the popular consensus now rejected race-based policing. A New
York Times poll following the shooting of Amadou Diallo showed minorities in
New York were sharply critical of the Mayor's office and his police
department. 243 The survey found three quarters of the black population and half
the Hispanic population disapproved of the way Giuliani was doing his job. 2"
238. See David M. Herszenhorn, The Diallo Shooting: The Statistics;Arrests Drop and
Shootings Rise as the Police, GiulianiSays, Are Distracted,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3
[hereinafter Herszenhorn, Diallo Shooting].
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See Editorial, Respectful Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at A24.
242. See Herszenhorn, Diallo Shooting, supra note 238, at B3.
243. See Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police are
Biased,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
244. See id. Whites answering the same question approved of Giuliani by 62%. Id.
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Forty-five percent of Hispanics found the city was safer in 1999 than it had been
four years earlier, while 47% of blacks found the city was about the same.245
Forty-seven percent of all New Yorkers agreed that the policies of the Giuliani
administration had caused an increase in police brutality.24 6 Most blacks and
Hispanics felt that New York City police were doing a fair or poor job.247 In
addition, 70% of all those polled said "the police often engage[] in brutality
against blacks. 248
A similar DailyNews poll showed that Giuliani' s popularity plummeted after
the Diallo shooting.249 When asked about his low figures, Giuliani responded,
'"The complexity of people's opinions are very, very hard to measure and
polling is an inexact science. "'250 The NYPD was experiencing a high amount
of racial tension at the time leading up to the Parade. In addition to the Louima
and Diallo incidents, several of the department's own officers attacked the
" ' The Latino Officers
NYPD just one year before the Parade assaults.25
Association sought an injunction in federal court to allow them to march in
uniform during the 1999 Puerto Rican Day Parade. 2 The president of the
Latino Officers Association, Anthony Miranda, said, "'It's unfortunate that the
NYPD continually engenders a policy of retaliation against our organization for
standing against discrimination, civil rights violations and police misconduct by
high-ranking members of the department.'253
The final straw in the unraveling of Mayor Giuliani's ability to convince
people to support aggressive policing occurred during his aborted senatorial
campaign. Hillary Clinton exploited the popular shift against the NYPD,
contending that "the Louima and Diallo cases were not just 'horrific', but
symptomatic of problems in the city's overall approach to policing."2 "

245. See id. 63% of whites felt it was more safe in 1999. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See Maureen Fan, PollLows Hardto Figure-Rudy, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 29,
1999, at 52.
250. See id.
251. See Zamgba J. Browne, Puerto Rican Cops Take NYPD to Court, N.Y. AMSTERDAM
NEWS, June 16, 1999, at 10.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. Bob Herbert, In America; A DelicateBalance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at A29; see
alsoJoel Siegel, I Would Help Unite Cops, Peopleof Color,DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 4,
2000, at 12. Hillary Clinton also remarked: "We need to take steps to... create a climate in
which that sort of incident doesn't occur. I have looked all over this country and I have worked
on these issues for a very long time, and there are cities where the crime rate has gone down and
where relations between people of color and the police have improved at the same time." Id.
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Clinton's attacks made the NYPD's practices an embarrassment to their greatest
ally, and may have led officers to avoid any potential racial controversies.
After the popular discourse shifted against racial profiling, the NYPD took
a hands-off approach to racial minority events. Sources have claimed
enforcement was much stricter at parades in which the majority of participants
were white, where "you can't sip a beer in the doorway of a bar," as opposed to
racial minority parades, where "you can smoke a joint on the street and they
'
won't touch you because the politicians are afraid of a backlash."255
Veteran
officers who worked the Puerto Rican Day Parade blamed department policies
for the violence that ensued.25 6 The officers said the Puerto Rican Day Parade
was treated with a softer touch than other events - even those less populated to prevent a predominantly white police force from provoking a race riot.257
Some suggest that police are "told to treat the Puerto Rican Day Parade and
West Indian American Day Carnival Parade with kid gloves while they've
'
cracked down on the St. Patrick's Day Parade."258
Some Officers claim that
"there is an unspoken double standard in patrolling the National Puerto Rican
Day Parade - a practice of soft enforcement that may have enabled the sexual
'
mayhem in Central Park."259
VI. Third Stage of Terry's Seesaw Effect in New York: The DiscourseShift
Encouragesthe NYPD to Depolice RacialMinorities
[Liaw is not simply a system of ideas but a series of consequences
that human beings inscribe on the lives of other human beings
through the medium of those ideas.26
Cultural context matters because it is always the precursor to the changes in
enforcement practices that reflect changes in how particular identity groups are
viewed.
There is substantial evidence that police officers refused to exercise their
Terry powers while women were harassed and physically assaulted by groups
255. See Alice McQuillan, Cops Hurt By Lack of Force,DAILY NEWS (New York), June 14,
2000, at 3.
256. Alice McQuillan et al., 'Cops Just Stayed There': Witnesses Say Police Didn't Stop
Assaults, DAILY NEWS (New York), June 14, 2000, at 3.
257. Id.
258. Juan Gonzalez, New Steps Needed To PoliceParade,DALY NEWS (New York), June
16, 2000, at 8.
259. Bill Hutchinson, Finest Say There'sDouble Standardat Parades,DAILY NEWS (New
York), June 15, 2000, at 2.
260. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 6 (denying anyone could view law from
above).
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of men following the Parade. For instance, a man running laps around Central
Park stated that on three different occasions he alerted police officers that
groups of men had sprayed water on women's shirts and made lewd
comments.2 6' The jogger stated police never intervened.2 62 A woman who was
physically stripped and groped stated that police officers ignored her request for
assistance. 63 The mother of a teenaged victim claims police officers responded
to her daughter's cries for help by merely pointing toward a nearby
ambulance. 2 4
Officers have told reporters they refused to act at the Parade to avoid political
controversy. Essentially, the officers claimed they were suffering from
"motivational distress." As one officer put it, "'[Y]ou're never going to get in
trouble by not doing anything.' 261 The thinking was rooted in conflict
avoidance: "'Are you the one who is going to precipitate a riot? The political
' 2
fallout would be a career-ender. You'd be doing midnights in the Bronx. ' 1
Perhaps then, the police officers' non-response to post-Parade assaults was
simply a matter of individuals seeking to "keep their heads low."
In fact, police officers' claims of "motivational distress" can be situated
within the recent racial criticisms of the Giuliani administration. One officer
stated the NYPD failed to respond to the violence at the Parade because of the
racial controversy over the police slayings of racial minorities. 267 The same
officer stated that police decisions during the Parade were affected by tensions
between the NYPD and racial minority communities.268 Police officers had
recently been tried on charges in the slaying of Diallo. 269 Additionally, Puerto
Ricans have been "African Americanized" in New York City, 270 so police action
261. Barstow & Chivers, supra note 19, at Al (describing incidents of sexual assault
following the Parade).
262. See id.
263. Editorial, The Outragein CentralPark,N.Y. TIMES, June 14,2000, at A26 (describing
victims' reactions to police inaction).

264. See id.
265. Purnick, supra note 23, at B 1 (quoting Deputy Chief Thomas P. Fahey) (discussing
officers reactions to the Parade assaults).
266. Id. (quoting Deputy Chief Thomas P. Fahey).
267. See id. (quoting Deputy Chief Thomas P. Fahey).
268. See id. (quoting Deputy Chief Thomas P. Fahey). The same officer stated there was a
Department policy of backing off during demonstrations to avoid controversy with racial
minority communities. Id.
269. Four NYPD officers were tried but acquitted of the New York City slaying of unarmed
African immigrant Amadou Diallo by an Albany, New York jury. See generally Susan Sachs,
U.S. DecidesNot to Prosecute4 Officers Who Killed Diallo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at BI
(discussing charges remaining against the officers).
270. See Grosfoguel & Georas, supra note 32 (comparing treatment of Cubans, Dominicans
and Puerto Ricans in New York City).
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against Puerto Ricans would be associated with prior police actions against
African Americans. As previously noted, Giuliani had consciously tied his
political future to the performance of the police department. 27' He had run for
Mayor on a platform of "cleaning up" the city's "crime problem, ' 272 while
implicitly racializing the crime problem.273 Thus, the officers' explicit
statements about their need to "lay off' racial minorities following the Parade in other words, to
not exercise their Terry powers - are grounded in that
274
political context.
The conclusion we should draw from Terry's seesaw effect in New York is
that granting police officers excessive discretion has a high cost. Officers will
be tempted to take advantage of a cultural context supporting crime fighting by
overenforcing the doctrine against racial minorities. Such overenforcement can
itself lead to popular controversy over racial profiling and a shift to popular
criticism of the police. In response, officers will be tempted to swing to the
other extreme and underenforce the doctrine in racial minority communities.
That is the "seesaw effect" we saw occur in New York.
VII. Conclusion
Cultural context matters.
I concluded my Article on the Drug War's deleterious effects on Fourth
Amendment law by declaring, "It is past time to start a 'Fourth Amendment
war."' 275 This Article's explication of the Terry doctrine's ability to lead to not
only extreme racial profiling, but also depolicing, makes the urgency of that call
all the more apparent. In answering the call, however, we must not fail to
consider the ways that cultural context matters in the translation of doctrines into
particular enforcement practices. Our re-articulation of the Fourth Amendment
must include a re-articulation of cultural expectations. Consider the words of
journalist Clarence Page:
271. See, e.g., William Glaberson, GiulianiResigns as U.S. Attorney; Still Undecided on
MayoralBid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1989, at Al (discussing speculation that Giuliani would run
for Mayor on a platform of cleaning up crime).
272. See, e.g., Tom Robbins, The Con and the Mayor, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 1, 2000, at 45

(noting Giuliani's continued role in the Republican Party as a voice for its "get-tough-on-crime"
policies).
273. See generally Cotts, supra note 20, at 32 (blaming Giuliani's policies for increased
racial profiling).
274. See Jill Smolowe et al., Unanswered Cries: Victims of a Central Park Sexual
"Wilding" Say Police Ignored Their Pleas For Help, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, July 3, 2000, at 63
("'These cops were told in no uncertain terms, 'Hands off.' The last thing the city and the
politicians can afford is a picture in the papers .... ').
275. See Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 895 (concluding
scholars must re-articulate meaning Fourth Amendment doctrine).
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Police officers have a tough job, but it is not made any easier by a
populace that is frightened or resentful of them. To do their jobs
better, police should have more selections on their crime-fighting
menus than a) excessive force or b) complete indifference.276
That call for policing that simultaneously avoids both racial profiling and
depolicing is the type of re-articulation of what constitutes appropriate popular
expectations of officers that needs to be encouraged.

276. Clarence Page, Critics of Cops Still Need the Cops, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2000, at 17.

